An examination of independent fiscal councils and their orientation to the future and policy making by Connor, Stuart
 1 
 
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in the European Journal of Futures 
Research. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40309-017-0124-6 
 
Stuart Connor 
 
An examination of independent fiscal councils and their orientation to the future and policy making.    
 
European Journal of Futures Research  
 
 
Reader in Social Welfare, 
University of Wolverhampton 
Room 204, Millennium City Building  
City Campus 
Wulfruna Street 
Wolverhampton 
UK 
WV1 1LY 
Email – stuart.connor@wlv.ac.uk 
Tel: 01902 323004 
 
 
Abstract The aim of this paper is to review the rationale, nature and operation of independent fiscal councils (IFCs) in 
order to gain insights into how futures are being configured at executive levels of government and to examine how 
futures could be incorporated in policy making. The emphasis IFCs have placed on non-partisanship, transparency and 
forecasting is viewed as reflecting a particular understanding of the problem of public debt and a limited understanding 
of the future and policy making. Located within the context of increasing technocratic tendencies, it is argued that IFCs 
can be seen as part of efforts to secure the de-politicisation of policy making. Attempts to secure the de-politicisation of 
policy making may at best, be considered laudable, but naïve, and at worst, represents an ideological sleight of hand in 
attempts to colonise the future. Moving forward, it is argued that strategic foresight can make a vital contribution to an 
open form of policy making that deepens and extends an understanding of what the future could be - the necessary ficta 
of policy making.  
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Introduction 
Questions over the form of knowledge and the role of analysis in relation to policy making are varied and contentious 
[1]. Tensions in theory and practice exist between claims to objectivity and appeals to deliberative processes in the 
constitution of policy making [2]. Such tensions are exacerbated when policy making’s inherent orientation to the future 
is made explicit. Not only does policy’s concern with that which has not yet happened bring in to question the 
application of a range of orthodox forms of research  [3,4], but it also brings to the fore questions of how possible and 
preferred futures are to be identified, discussed and realised [5]. Such tensions regarding the role of knowledge and the 
nature of policy making are epitomised and can be explored through an examination of the status and operations of 
independent fiscal councils (IFCs). The aim of this paper is to review the rationale, form and function of IFCs in order 
to gain insights into how futures are and could be represented and realised in policy making.  
 
Following a discussion of the challenge the future presents to policy making, an outline of the reasoning that has 
informed the development of IFCs, that is, a response to a particular rendering of the problem of public debt, is 
provided. The rationale and implications of IFC’s efforts to act as umpire to debates on the future of fiscal policy are 
considered under the headings of non – partisanship, transparency and forecasting. The claim to independence and the 
predominance of forecasting within the work of IFCs is considered to represent a necessary but insufficient condition 
for an open and transparent form of policy making. Located within a broader tendency towards efforts to de-politicise 
policy making, the non-partisan status of IFCs may at best, be considered laudable, but naïve, and at worst, represent an 
ideological sleight of hand in attempts to colonise the future through efforts to project current interests. In addition to 
identifying the probable outcomes of current policies and practices, an open form of policy making also requires 
knowledge of possible futures and the range of methods and conditions under which these futures can be realised. Such 
an augmentation can be provided by strategic foresight’s capacity to extend the horizon of possibilities and deepen an 
understanding of the assumptions that inform the policies and practices that seek to realise particular futures. The paper 
concludes by arguing that strategic foresight’s potential to venture beyond positive analyses of what will probably be 
and normative analyses of what should be, not only offers a vital rejoinder to a cacophony of claims making and 
technocratic tendencies, but may also help create the conditions for an open, transparent and transformative form of 
knowledge for policy making. 
 
The Future and Policy Making 
An inherent, but not always explicit, aspect of policy making is its orientation to the future. Put another way, if policy 
making is not seeking to shape the future, then what is it doing? And yet, despite some notable examples [
6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19] the future, and how best to make sense of and orient to the future, remains an 
underserved issue in the policy literature.  In accounts advocating and explaining the potential and actual use of 
strategic foresight in policy making, attention is drawn to an increasingly complex, changing and uncertain environment 
and the appetite this has created for knowledge as to how best to prepare and manoeuvre in a brave new world 
[20,21,22]. In contrast to more orthodox forms of planning, the value of strategic foresight is found in its potential to 
extend the horizons of what is recognised as possible and plausible futures [23,24]. Where orthodox planning may seek 
to assess different options in order to arrive at an optimum process and outcome [25], strategic foresight is most potent 
when not only seeking to extend the realm of possible futures, but also deepening understandings of how futures can be 
realised and the values and interests that support particular visions of the future [26,27]. This opening up of the future is 
not always well understood or welcomed and may go some way to explaining the relatively limited take up of foresight 
work by policy-makers (28,29,30,31,32).  
 
For those wanting to know the future and reduce uncertainty, pluralising possibilities can confuse and confound. 
Opening the future also undermines the efforts of those seeking to make particular futures appear inevitable, thereby 
securing their own positions through time. Therefore some caution is required when seeking to advocate and develop 
the use of strategic foresight in policy making. Given the role of strategic foresight to reassert the primacy of the future 
as a domain of the possible, strategic foresight does not claim to know the future, but understand and negotiate futures. 
To encompass the future as the unknown is a project fundamentally at odds with the empiricist epistemologies 
underlying orthodox approaches to planning and the future[33].Better techniques for gathering and analysing 
information are a necessary but insufficient condition for policy making. Rather than claim to know what the future is, 
or what the future should be, strategic foresight subverts the inevitable and envisions and educes what the future could 
be [34]. In this regard, strategic foresight does not just offer a different set of tools, but presents a different ontology and 
orientation as to how to understand the future [35,36,37].  
 
The openness of strategic foresight may well provide a challenge to orthodox notions of policy making, but it is argued 
that its assumptions with regard to the nature and use of knowledge are well suited to policymaking understood as a 
combination of meaning making and the mobilization of power [38,39,40,41,42,43]. Policy makers need to make sense 
of what might be ahead and in the process develop accounts and claims as to the nature and scale of a given problem 
and subsequent solutions [44]. This sense making is made all the more difficult when the grounds for making claims are 
unclear and uncertain [45].  Policy makers are also required to mobilise support and attend to opposition in order to 
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realise their plans [46]. In this regard, the process of organizing and managing coalitions cannot be divorced from 
questions of meaning making and power [47,48,49,50,51]. 
 
Understood through this lens, the future is a contested and potent site that plays a vital role in processes of meaning 
making and the mobilisation of power.  The future is a domain where both visions over what the future is and should be 
and the policies and practices that this future requires, are subject to conflict [52]. Both appeals to a better tomorrow, or 
the fear of what is to come, can serve as means by which policy makers seek to legitimate the actions, conflicts and 
sacrifices taken today. In this context, claims to know the future are inherently political. Knowledge claims and 
forecasts in particular become a resource for determining what is and will be deemed realistic and what actions are 
taken to be feasible in and towards the future [53].This is not necessarily a problem if both the future and the space for 
making claims on the future remain open [54]. However, described as a form of temporal imperialism [55] ‘realistic’ 
views of the future displace what are deemed as unrealistic alternatives - closing the future as a space for projecting a 
range of fears, hopes, and calls for another world [56]. Consequently, agencies granted a licence by authorities to know 
the future have the capacity to wield significant influence over what is deemed possible and desirable [57] and the 
potential to shape today and tomorrow [58]. Therefore attention needs to be given to who receives a licence for 
representing the future and the conditions under which these licenses are held. 
 
Independent Fiscal Councils (IFCs) 
IFCs are a set of institutions that have been granted a license to know the future. Described as one of the most important 
innovations in public financial management [59] IFCs are independent, publicly funded institutions established with the 
aim of strengthening the commitment of elected officials and the wider publics to sustainable public finances [60]. A 
number of governmental and non-governmental agencies provide forecasts and provide assessments of government 
programmes. What distinguishes IFCs is that they possess macroeconomic competence, are independent from the 
political system, and arguably, most importantly for the purposes of this paper have a clear watchdog function that 
includes assessing the long term sustainability of fiscal policy [61]. At the time of writing, there are 39 national IFCs 
recorded in 37 countries [62] and the number is expected to continue to rise. Fiscal councils have been in existence 
since the middle of the 20th century, but it was the Global Financial Crisis in 2008-09 and significant increases in 
government deficits and debts that followed that gave real impetus to the development of IFCs and a trebling in the 
number of IFCs since 2008. 
 
In the years following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008–09, public debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratios 
reached near historical highs [63,64]. Concerns over the sustainability of fiscal policy were in evidence prior to the 
Global Financial Crisis [65,66,67], but the deficits and debts that followed, provided a platform for raising questions of 
fiscal discipline [68,69]. Informed by public choice theories, what have been described as notions of democratic failure 
[70], resulting from a combination of political distortions and weak public financial management, have been cited as 
drivers behind a rise in government deficits and debt [71,72]. The logic of this position is that the demands and short 
sightedness of voters combined with the opportunism of politicians, keen to satisfy the electorates’ appetites particularly 
on the eve of elections, creates an inherent tendency for political democracies to live beyond their means and 
accumulate debt [73,74]. Of particular interest to this paper is the argument that elected officials have a tendency to use 
their discretionary powers to focus on accruing short term electoral gains at the expense of medium and long term 
economic costs, in the form of increased public deficits and debts. 
 
A first wave of measures to tackle fiscal indiscipline was the use of fiscal rules on acceptable levels of debt, deficits or 
expenditure [75,76]. Continued concerns over government debt suggested that in addition to formulating better rules, 
more could and should be done to ensure the transparency and accountability of fiscal policy [77]. In part drawing on 
the precedent of independent central banks operating in the domain of monetary policy, proposals for the establishment 
of a new wave of IFCs were tasked with improving policymakers’ incentives to opt for sound fiscal policies and avoid 
deficit bias were made [78,79].   
 
Unlike central banks, IFCs would not have discretion to set policy instruments, as elected officials would retain ultimate 
responsibility for fiscal policy. Instead, IFCs would provide independent and transparent assessments of the fiscal 
policies produced by governments [80]. IFCs would have a remit to highlight broken commitments, unsound policies 
and missed targets. The rationale being that the scrutiny provided by IFCs would dis-incentivise elected officials from 
providing overly optimistic assessments of fiscal policy or [81]. Subsequently the transparency that it is hoped IFCs 
provide In this regard, IFCs are designed to help Over a the political cycle elected officials would discourage any 
opportunistic pre-election tax give-aways or spending sprees - improving democratic accountability and realigning 
policy makers and the wider publics’ expectations as to what constitutes a sustainable fiscal policy [82]. Implicit in this 
assessment is a recognition that the actions that will need to follow from an independent assessment will not be 
welcomed or prove popular with a wider public. Subsequently, the role of IFCs is to help policy makers and the wider 
public to face facts and adapt to future requirements. 
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Arguments for the establishment of IFCs with a remit to ground and limit the excesses of politicised policy actors and 
help ensure the discipline and sustainability of fiscal policies have proved irresistible. Advocates for the establishment 
and operation of IFCs include the IMF, World Bank, OECD and EU. In the EU, within the context of discussions on the 
sovereign debt crisis and a ‘fiscal compact’, arguments for the establishment of IFCs have proved particularly potent. 
The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the (European) Economic and Monetary Union requires Euro 
area member states to have an independent body to monitor compliance with national fiscal rules and produce, assess or 
endorse macroeconomic projections [83]. How IFCs assess and promote the credibility of fiscal plans does vary, from 
what has been termed as government-sponsored cheerleader of fiscal discipline through to active agents in the 
maintenance of fiscal discipline [84].There is no one size fits all model for IFCs as there are variations with regard to 
status, mandate and tasks, leadership, staff arrangements, and budget. The heterogeneity of IFCs, in part reflects the 
values, resources and requirements of particular jurisdictions and contingent factors explaining levels of deficits and 
debts [85]. What follows is a discussion of the importance placed on non-partisanship, transparency and forecasting in 
the form of IFCs and how such forms and functions reflect and realise particular understanding of the problem of public 
debt and conceptions of the future and policy making. 
 
(Non) Partisanship – Independent but engaged. 
A commitment to non-partisanship is considered central to the work of IFCs, particularly with regard to assessing and 
promoting credible fiscal policies [86,87]. The perceived independent status of the assessments produced by IFC is 
central to their remit to counter and minimise the alleged tendency of governments to produce over-optimistic forecasts 
and or use technical loopholes to bend, if not break, fiscal rules. This places the onus on IFCs to demonstrate the rigour 
and independence of their work. As in effect IFCs become the arbiter of what are deemed realistic assessments, IFCs 
are not able to appeal to an external authority by which to judge their work, as they are the authority. In the more 
immediate and short term aspects of their work IFCs assess the performance of their own forecasts after the event, 
against outturns and against those of other forecasters as part of efforts to increase transparency and accountability. 
Identifying, reviewing and explaining forecast errors also helps IFCs improve their own efforts to make sense of the 
way in which the economy and public finances behave, and further improve forecast techniques and judgements for the 
future. However, when it comes to assessments of the long-term sustainability of fiscal policy, such ex-post analyses are 
not available.  
  
Therefore, IFC’s are not necessarily assessed by how closely the forecast correspondences with actuality, but the degree 
to which such assessments can be judged to be independent from the influence of politics. IFCs do seek to produce 
accurate forecasts, but it is the coherence and cogency of the models and assumptions that inform the forecasts and the 
impartiality of the IFCs that is central to their legitimacy and function with regard to policy making. In essence, the 
rationale for contracting out the production and assessment of fiscal forecasts is that even if people disagree with the 
particular conclusions that have been reached, there is the reassurance that the conclusions reflect dispassionate 
professional judgement - rather than the wishful thinking of politicians. Such accounts of the ideal relationship of IFCs 
to policy making can be likened to the role of umpires, referees, and judges. Although it would be good if the 
judgements exhibited by IFCs, like judges, could be shown to be correct, it is the independence and more specifically, 
impartiality of IFCs that is most valued [88]. That is, IFCs are impartial with respect to their forecasts, in the sense that 
they are not seen to be influenced by those who may be benefited or harmed by such forecasts and assessments.  
 
However, a threat to this impartiality stems from IFC’s remit to promote sustainable fiscal policies and make direct 
contributions to public debates on fiscal policy. IFCs are charged with enhancing and ensuring the transparency of fiscal 
policy making. Through the use of briefings, hearings and most notably the open publication of independent analysis, 
assessments, and forecasts, IFCs seek to raise public awareness about the consequences of certain policy paths and 
contribute to the development of a stability culture, which in turn is intended to reduce a public appetite for fiscal 
indiscipline [89]. Thus not only are IFCs to be judged on the accuracy of their forecasts but the potentially contradictory 
measure of IFC’s capacity and record for initiating necessary changes. The reputational damage that IFCs can pose to 
elected officials may well be a vital tool in seeking to keep elected officials on course, but it also politicises the project. 
Where the assessment of an IFC counters a government’s position or accords with one party’s views, it is almost 
inevitable that offended parties will be quick to question methodologies and the independence of an IFC. 
 
Transparency 
In part a reflection of efforts to anticipate accusations of partisanship, IFCs undertake a number of measures to ensure 
the transparency of their work. This includes detailing the assumptions underpinning methods and models and the 
criteria by which the forecasts should be judged. IFCs are also known to publish logs of their day to day operations, 
particularly with regard to relationships with elected officials. IFCs evaluate and publish reports on the accuracy of its 
forecast against those of other forecasters and after the event to help increase transparency and help users to understand 
how forecasts are made and revised. However, it is argued that this is a partial view of transparency. The detail and 
volume of technical notes on methods and models do nothing to shed light on the arguably more problematic deeper and 
hidden assumptions and interests that informs the raison d’etre of IFCs.  
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As noted above, IFCs are posited as a remedy to the relative profligacy and indiscipline of elected officials seeking to 
win the favour of a short-term and self-interested electorate. This is a valid argument, in the technical sense of the term, 
but due to the string of questionable and stylised assumptions regarding the ‘rational’ behaviour of electorates and 
politicians [90], not necessarily a sound argument. Far from a failure of democracy, the most dramatic leaps in public 
indebtedness can be attributed to a failure of capitalism and the form of neoliberalism at the heart of the great financial 
recession. During a period when public choice theorists claim policy makers were under increased pressure from the 
public for increased spending, it is argued that there has actually been a steady decline in the capacity of democratic 
publics to mobilise and make demands on the public purse. It is also difficult to explain tax cuts for the rich and 
corporations, the absorption of private debt by the public and the continued retrenchment of social protection, through 
recourse to the alleged self-interest of democratic publics. Calls for such measures are much more likely to find their 
origins in the architects of neoliberalism, central bank economists and ministers of finance and trade, the very same 
constituencies that have been calling for measures to ensure disciplined fiscal policy, privatisation and liberalisation. 
 
Seeking an alternative explanatory account, the accumulation of public debt needs to be understood, ultimately, in the 
context of declining growth [91]. On the one hand, advanced capitalist economies have become unwilling, or found it 
increasingly difficult, to honour post WWII social contracts. On the other hand, the measures associated with a 
neoliberal project, were seen as necessary response to flagging growth rates. A detailed exposition of debates regarding 
the politics of public debt is beyond the scope of this paper, but the neglect of alternative accounts of debt within the 
rationale or operations of IFCs can be noted. This brings into question the independence and transparency of IFCs. Far 
from offering a view from nowhere, the particular assessments of public choice theorists appears to run through the 
whole DNA of IFCs. The opacity of such a position makes any claims of transparency highly questionable. This does 
not necessarily mean that IFCs are to be seen as part of some conspiratorial hegemonic plot, but a reminder to attend to 
the raft of biases and heuristics deeply embedded in policies and practices. 
 
Forecasts 
A vital part of IFCs corrective function is the use of forecasts. Proposals for the establishment of IFCs focus on the 
benefits that independent and transparent assessments and forecasts can bring to policy making [92,93]. The forecasts 
undertaken by IFCs can take several forms and functions, in part depending on the nature and relation to other 
government agencies responsible for forecasting [94]. IFCs in the Netherlands and the UK have a remit to produce the 
official economic and fiscal forecasts used by governments. IFCs in Canada, Denmark, Korea, Mexico and United 
States produce alternative forecasts, while IFCs in Austria, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden 
provide an opinion on, or endorsement of, the government's forecasts.  
 
A common feature of the forecasts produced by IFCs is the projection of what is likely to happen if policies are to 
remain unchanged. In this regard forecasts have a tendency to project existing social practices, visions and interests, so 
that the future is little more than a linear projection of yesterday [95]. Such probabilistic renderings erase potential by 
annihilating 'any future' that is not contained in the present [96]. The hegemonic present becomes the norm against 
which futures deviate and need to be restored. There are IFCs, for example the Congressional Budget Office in the 
USA, that examine what ‘unchanged policy’ actually means and consider different debt targets and alternative paths for 
reducing debts. However, the scenarios developed assume and operate within the unstated parameters that today’s 
predominant social, political, economic relations will continue far into the future. The result is that when significant 
increases in debt to GDP ratios are forecast [97,98,99], it is today’s established remedies that tend to predominate. 
Furthermore, discussions regarding the social impact of such measures and a deeper questioning of the relations and 
interests that create the problem of debt are notable by their absence.  
 
Returning to and extending the analogy of the umpire, it is one thing to ask the question whether the umpire is impartial 
and transparent in the application of the rules. It is quite another to ask if the rules and aims of the game are correct. As 
it stands there is evidence to suggest that IFCs are more often than not exemplary in ensuring a transparent and 
independent application of the rules. However, the absence of an extended consideration as to whether alternative rules 
and goals could be applied reinforces the notion that the current game is the only game, and by extension, limits the 
horizon of possibilities for consideration by policy makers and the wider public. As today’s givens, interests, relations 
and practices are cast into the future, forecasts become a tool for those seeking to sustain their established positions 
[100,101]. The result is a tendency to project an extended moment, where alternative futures are erased and the future 
becomes a continuous present [102,103]. 
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper has not been to evaluate the work of IFCs per se, but to consider the actual and potential role of 
futures in the interplay between the exertion of power and construction of meaning in long term policy making [104]. 
The establishment of IFCs have enabled the marshalling of the necessary expertise to make sense of the complex and 
uncertain realm of macroeconomics and policy making, but also reflect and help realise what are described as 
technocratic tendencies in policy making - where politics is substituted for expertise. Expertise, as expressed through 
and in the work of research, advisory committees and special advisors, forms an important part of policy making, but 
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the privileging of technical knowledge and expertise, unconstrained by political processes, is what characterises 
technocracy. Technocracy is most visible when individuals with technical expertise occupy the positions of government 
normally taken by politicians [105]. More broadly, technocracy is also evident when democratic deliberations by 
elected officials are substituted for the application of the scientific method and specialised knowledge to address social 
issues and questions of policy making. The logic behind technocratic tendencies is that experts are able to establish 
what needs to be done. The necessary measures may not be considered palatable to a wider public, so in the absence of 
a popular consent, to take choice out of the equation, both figuratively and on occasion literally, leaves the demos with 
no alternative but to accept its fate. Such a tendency is evident in IFC’s remit to align popular opinion with realistic 
assessments as to what the future will and implicitly, should be, though admittedly the emphasis is on aligning the 
public and politicians with the ‘new realities’ of fiscal policy. It is for this reason that the technocratic practices of IFCs 
should be seen as a legitimating practice and part of an increasing tendency to de-politicise policy making [106]. The 
rise of technocracy, at the expense of deliberative mechanisms, poses a number of challenges [107]. A lack of 
democratic accountability and scrutiny means that there is the potential for 'the avowed super-brains' of the ‘New 
Mandarins’ to determine what is possible [108]. Legislative bodies, never mind wider publics, are also unable to 
scrutinize or hold to account decision making where there is a monopoly of technocratic elites in policy making [109].  
Viewed within the context of increasing technocratic tendencies, where experts no longer inform decision making but 
become the decision makers, IFCs can be seen as part of efforts to secure the de-politicisation of policy making. 
Subsequently, in their current form, the work of IFCs may at best be considered laudable but naïve, and at worst, 
represent an ideological sleight of hand in attempts to project established interests into the future. 
 
The future is too vital to be entrusted exclusively to technocrats. A useful rejoinder to technocratic approaches is 
strategic foresight’s focus on broadening horizons and sustaining an open form of policy making. By systematically 
exploring, creating, and assessing alternative futures, policy actors are able to consider and rehearse a wide range of 
future operating conditions and relations. In addition to identify alternative futures, a form of open policy making also 
contains a critique of the present moment [110] and attempts to identify potential points of intervention and agents of 
change [111]. By subverting notions of a determined future [112], strategic foresight reclaims the present as a site of 
tendencies and potentiality [113]. Furthermore, rather than seek to provide a view from nowhere or promise a false 
sense of certainty, strategic foresight has the potential to consider a plurality of positions and thereby extend the menu 
of options for what could be done and the likely winners and losers of each position. This open approach to futures and 
policy making offers a rigorous and creative approach to highlighting the choices that are available, the anticipated 
outcomes of those choices and the interests and assumptions that those choices reflect. By further developing the 
capacity of policy actors to imagine and acts towards the future, strategic foresight produces the necessary ficta for 
policy making. In this regard, strategic foresight further enhances the capacity of policy actors to scrutinise policy 
proposals and articulate a publics’ choices. However, it is also apparent that strategic foresight’s capacity to disrupt 
established understandings and relations means that it is an approach that will not always be welcomed by policy 
makers. Such barriers should not deter those seeking to develop the role of strategic foresight in policy making, but acts 
as a reminder that the uptake of strategic foresight is not just dependent on demonstrations of proficiency, but a 
willingness and ability to engage with and shape questions of politics and power.  
 
References 
                                                 
1
 Best J (2008) Social problems. London, WW.Norton & Company 
2
 Connor S (2013) What’s your problem. Northwich, Critical Publishing. 
3
 Neumann IB and Øverland EF (2004) International Relations and Policy Planning: The Method of Perspectivist 
Scenario Building. International Studies Perspectives (5): 258-277. 
4
 de Jouvenel B (1967) The Art of Conjecture. Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London. 
5
 Dunmire PL (2010) Knowing and Controlling the future: A review of futurology. Prose Studies 32(3): 240-263. 
6
 Tugwell, F (1973) Search for alternatives: public policy and the study of the future. Winthrop Publishers, Cambridge, 
MA. 
7
 Schwartz P (1991) The art of the long view. Doubleday/Currency, New York, NY. 
8
 Habegger B (2009) Strategic foresight in public policy: Reviewing the experiences of the UK, Singapore, and the 
Netherlands. Futures 42: 49-58. 
9
 Levitas R (2011) The concept of utopia. Peter Lang, Oxford. 
10
 Slaughter RA (1995) The foresight principle: cultural recovery in the 21
st
 Century. Praeger, Westport. 
11
 Slaughter RA (2004). Futures beyond dystopia: creating social foresight. Routledge Falmer, London & New York. 
12
 Ogilvy J (2002) Creating better futures. Oxford University Press, New York, NY. 
13
 Voros J (2003) A generic foresight process framework. Foresight 5(3): 10-21. 
14
 Herault B (2006) Public futures studies: themes and variations. Foresight 8(2): 57-69. 
15
 Schultz WL (2006) The cultural contradictions of managing change: using horizon scanning in an evidence-based 
policy context, Foresight 8 (4): 3-12. 
16
 Inayatullah S (2008) Six pillars: Futures thinking for transforming. Foresight 10(1): 4-21. 
 7 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
17
 Riedy C (2009) The influence of futures work on public policy and sustainability. Foresight 11(5): 40–56. 
18
 Van der Steen M, van Twist MJW (2012) Beyond use: evaluating foresight that fits. Futures 44(5): 75–486. 
19
 Sardar Z (2013) Future. London, Hodder & Stoughton. 
20
 van Asselt MBA, Mesman J, van’t Klooster SA (2007) Dealing with prognostic uncertainty. Futures 39(6): 669–684. 
21
 Walker WE, Lempert RJ, Kwakkel JH (2012) Deep uncertainty. Delft, Delft University of Technology and RAND, 
Santa Monica. 
22
 Tuomi I (2012) Foresight in an unpredictable world. Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 24(8): 735-751. 
23
 Habegger B (2009) Strategic foresight in public policy: Reviewing the experiences of the UK, Singapore, and the 
Netherlands. Futures 42: 49-58. 
24
 Wilkinson A (2016) Using strategic foresight methods to anticipate and prepare for the jobs-scare economy, 
European Journal of Futures Research. 4(12) DOI 10.1007/s40309-016-0094-0  
25
 Connor S (2013) What’s your problem. Critical Publishing, Northwich. 
26
 Slaughter RA (1995) The foresight principle: cultural recovery in the 21
st
 Century. Praeger, Westport, CT. 
27
 Inayatullah S (2004) The causal layered analysis (CLA) reader. Tamkang University, Tamsui, Taiwan. 
28
 Paillard S (2006) Futures studies and public decision in Sweden. Futures 38(1): 67-73 
29
 Boezeman D, Leroy P, Maas R, Kruitwagen S (2010) The (limited) political influence of ecological economics: a 
case study on Dutch environmental policies. Ecological Economics 69(9): 1756-
1764.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.04.013. 
30
 Nehme CC, de Miranda Santos M, Filho LF, Coelho GM (2012) Challenges in communicating the outcomes of a 
foresight study to advise decision-makers on policy and strategy. Science and Public Policy 39(2): 245–257. 
31
 Van der Steen M, & van Twist MJW (2012) Beyond use: evaluating foresight that fits. Futures 44(5): 75–486. 
32
 Sarpong D, Maclean M, and Alexander E (2013) Organizing strategic foresight: a contextual practice of ‘way finding. 
Futures 53: 33-41. 
33
 Adam B, Groves C (2007) Future matters. Brill, Leiden, Belgium. 
34
 Nandy A (1999) Futures and Dissent. In: Sardar Z (ed) Rescuing all our futures: the future of futures studies. Praegar, 
Westport, CT,  pp 227-233. 
35
 Bloch E (1986) The Principle of Hope, Vols. I, II & III. Trans, Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul Knight. Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford. 
36
 Dror Y (1975) Some fundamental philosophical, psychological and intellectual assumptions of future studies: the 
future as an academic discipline. In: Wolstenholme, G E W, O'Connor M (eds) Ciba Foundations Symposium 36. 
Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 145-166. 
37
 Poli R (2011) Steps towards an explicit ontology of the future, Journal of Futures Studies 16(1): 67 – 78 
38
 Baumgartner FR, Jones BD (1993) Agenda and instability in American politics. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, IL. 
39
 Hall PA (1993) Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: the case of economic policy making in Britain, 
Comparative Politics 25(3): 275–296. 
40
 Majone G (1996) Regulating Europe. London, Routledge. 
41
 Culpepper PD (2002) Powering, puzzling, and ‘pacting’: the informational logic of negotiated reforms. Journal of 
European Public Policy 9(5): 774–790. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501760210162357. 
42
 Bacchi C (2009) Analysing policy: what’s the problem represented to be? Pearson, Frenchs Forest, NSW. 
43
 Heclo H (2010) Modern social politics in Britain and Sweden: from relief to income maintenance. ECPR Press, 
Colchester. 
44
 Fischer F (2003) Reframing public policy discursive politics and deliberative practices. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
45
 de Jouvenel B (1967) The Art of Conjecture. Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London. 
46
 Connor S (2013) What’s your problem. Critical Publishing, Northwich. 
47
 Ham C and Hill M (1993) The policy process in the modern capitalist state. Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead.  
48
 Hisschemöller M & Hoppe R (1995) Coping with intractable controversies: the case for problem structuring in policy 
design and analysis. Knowledge and Policy 8(4): 40–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02832229. 
49
 Arts  B, Tatenhove J (2004) Policy and power: a conceptual framework between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ policy idioms. 
Policy Sciences 37(3–4): 339–356. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11077-005-0156-9.  
50
 Lazarus RJ (2008) Super wicked problems and climate change: restraining the present to liberate the future. Cornell 
Law Review 94: 1153–1233. 
51
 Vink MJ, Dewulf A, & Termeer C (2013) The role of knowledge and power in climate change adaptation 
governance: a systematic literature review. Ecology and Society 18(4) http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-05897-180446. 
52
 Dunmire PL (2010) Knowing and Controlling the future: A review of futurology, Prose Studies 32(3): 240-263. 
53
 Heller A (1999) A Theory of Modernity. Blackwell, London. 
54
 Adam B, Groves C (2007) Future matters. Brill, Leiden, Belgium. 
55
 Sardar Z (ed) (1999) Rescuing All Our Futures: The Future of Futures Studies. Praegar, Westport, CT. 
56
 Nowotny H. (1994) Time: The Modern and Postmodern Experience. Trans. Neville Plaice. 
 8 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Polity, Cambridge. 
57
 Graham P (2004) Predication, Propagation, and Mediation. In: Young L, Harrison C (eds) Systemic Functional 
Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis: Studies in Social Change. Continuum, London, pp 53–67. 
58
 Edelman, M (1988) Constructing the political spectacle. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
59
 OECD (2014) Recommendations of the council on principles for Independent Fiscal Councils. Public Governance 
and Territorial Development Directorate OECD Senior Budget Officials. OECD Network of Parliamentary Budget 
Officials and Independent Fiscal Institutions.  
60
 International Monetary Fund (2013) The Functions and Impacts of Fiscal Councils. IMF Policy Paper. International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
61
 Calmfors L, Wren-Lewis S (2011) What should fiscal councils do? Economic Policy 649-695. 
62
 IMF Fiscal Councils data set http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/council/. See - Debrun X, Zhang X, Lledó V (2017) 
The fiscal council dataset: a primer to the 2016 Vintage, IMF Working Paper. International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, DC. 
63
 Abbas SA, Belhocine N, El Ganainy A, Horton M (2010) Historical Public Debt Database,  IMF Working Paper, 
WP/10/245. Fiscal Affairs Department. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
64
 Reinhart CM, Reinhart V, Rogoff K (2012) Public debt overhangs: advanced-economy episodes since 1800. Journal 
of Economic Perspectives. 26(3): 69-86. 
65
 Buchanan JM (1958) Public principles of public debt: a defence and restatement. Richard R Irwin Inc, Homewood, 
IL. 
66
 Blanchard O, Chouraqui JC, Hagemann RP, Sartorial N (1990) The sustainability of fiscal policy: new answers to an 
old question, OECD Economic Studies. Autumn 15: 7-35. 
67
 von Hagen J, Harden IH (1995) Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline, European Economic Review. 
39. 
68
 Reinhart CM, Rogoff K (2009) This time is different: eight centuries of financial folly. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ. 
69
 Beetsma RMWJ. and Debrun X (2016) Fiscal Councils: Rationale and Effectiveness. IMF Working Paper. Fiscal 
Affairs Department: IMF WP/16/86. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
70
 Streeck, W. (2013) The politics of public debt: Neoliberalism, capitalist development and the restructuring of the 
state. German Economic Review 15(1): 143-165. 
71
 Buchanan JM, Tullock G, (1962) The calculus of consent: logical foundations of constitutional democracy. 
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. 
72
 Buchanan JM, Tullock G, (1977) The expanding public sector: Wagner squared. Public Choice 31: 147-150. 
73
 Buchanan JM, Wagner RE (1977) Democracy in deficit: the political legacy of Lord Keynes. Academic Press, New 
York. 
74
 Beetsma, RMWJ, Debrun X (2016) Fiscal councils: rationale and effectiveness. IMF Working Paper. Fiscal Affairs 
Department: IMF WP/16/86. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
75
 Wyplosz C (2005) Fiscal policy: institutions versus rules. National Institute Economic Review 191: 64–78. 
76
 International Monetary Fund (2009) Fiscal rules—anchoring expectations for sustainable public finances, IMF Policy 
Paper. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
77
 Hagemann R (2011) How can fiscal councils strengthen fiscal performance? OECD Journal: Economic Studies, Vol. 
2011/1.  
78
 Calmfors L, Wren-Lewis S (2011) What should fiscal councils do? Economic Policy 649-695. 
79
 Debrun X, Hauner D, Kumar MS (2009) Independent fiscal agencies. Journal of Economic Surveys 23(1): 44-81.  
80
 International Monetary Fund (2013) The functions and impacts of fiscal councils. IMF Policy Paper. International 
Monetary Fund,  Washington, DC. 
81
 Calmfors L, Wren-Lewis S (2011) What should fiscal councils do? Economic Policy 649-695. 
82
 Hagemann R (2011) How can fiscal councils strengthen fiscal performance? OECD Journal: Economic Studies, Vol. 
2011/1. 
83
 European Union (2012) Treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/agreements-conventions/agreement/?aid=2012008  
84
 Beetsma, RMWJ, Debrun X (2016) Fiscal Councils: Rationale and Effectiveness. IMF Working Paper. Fiscal Affairs 
Department: IMF WP/16/86. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
85
 Kopits G (ed.) (2013) Restoring public debt sustainability: the role of independent fiscal institutions. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.  
86
 Beetsma, RMWJ, Debrun X (2016) Fiscal councils: rationale and effectiveness. IMF Working Paper. Fiscal Affairs 
Department: IMF WP/16/86. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
87
 Von Trapp L, Lierert I, Werner J (2016) Principles for independent fiscal institutions and case studies. OECD Journal 
on Budgeting 15(2): DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/budget-15-5jm2795tv625 
88
 Connor S (2013) What’s your problem. Critical Publishing, Northwich. 
 9 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
89
 Debrun X, Kinda T (2014) Strengthening post-crisis fiscal credibility: fiscal councils on the rise—a new dataset. 
IMF, Working Paper No 14/58. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.  
90
 Streeck W (2013) The politics of public debt: Neoliberalism, capitalist development and the restructuring of the state. 
German Economic Review 15(1): 143-165. 
91
 ibid 
92
 Wren-Lewis S (1996) Avoiding fiscal fudge. New Economy 3. 
93
 Wyplosz C (2005) Fiscal policy: institutions versus rules. National Institute Economic Review 191: 64–78. 
94
 Calmfors L, Wren-Lewis S (2011) What should fiscal councils do? Economic Policy 649-695. 
95
 Nandy A (1999) Futures and dissent. In: Sardar Z (ed) Rescuing all our futures: the future of futures studies. Praegar, 
Westport, CT, pp 227-233. 
96
 Grosz E (1999) Becoming . . . an introduction. In Grosz E (ed) Becomings: Explorations in Time, Memory, and 
Futures. Cornell UP, Ithaca, NY. 
97
 National Assembly Budget Office (2012) 2012-2060 Long-term economic outlook and fiscal analysis. Seoul: 
Economic Policy Analysis Division / National Assembly Budget Office. 
98
 Congressional Budget Office (2016) The 2016 Long-term budget outlook. July 2016. Congressional Budget Office, 
Washington, DC. 
99
 Office for Budget Responsibility (2017) Fiscal sustainability report. January 2017. HMSO, London. 
100
 Boulding E (1970) Futurology and the imaging capacity of the West. World Futures Society Bulletin III(12): 1-21. 
101
 Waskow AI (1970) Running riot. Herder & Herder, New York, NY. 
102
 Nowotny, H. (1994) Time: the modern and postmodern experience. Trans. Plaice N. Polity, Cambridge. 
103
 Polak F (1973) The Image of the Future. Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
104
 Vink M, van der Steen M, and Dewulf A (2016) Dealing with long-term policy problems: Making sense of the 
interplay between meaning and power. Futures. DOI: 10.1016/j.futures.2016.01.003 
105
 McDonnell D, Valbruzzi M (2014) Defining and classifying technocrat-led and technocratic governments. European 
Journal of Political Research 53(4): 654-71. 
106
 Burnham P (2001) New Labour and the politics of de-politicisation. British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations 3(2): 127-149. 
107
 Pastorella G (2015) Technocratic governments in Europe: getting the critique right. Political Studies 64(4): 948-965. 
108
 Dunmire PL (2010) Knowing and controlling the future: A review of futurology. Prose Studies 32(3): 240-263 
109
 Loye D (1978) The knowable future: a psychology of forecasting and prophecy. John Wiley, New York, NY. 
110
 Polak F (1973) The image of the future. Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
111
 Levitas R (2011) The concept of utopia. Peter Lang, Oxford. 
112
 Nandy A (1999) Futures and dissent. In: Sardar Z (ed) Rescuing all our futures: the future of futures studies. Praegar, 
Westport, CT, pp 227-233. 
113
 Alessandrini A (2003) Reading the future. Cultural Studies 17(2): 211–29. 
 
 
 
